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Over the last ten years the Spanish credit market has undergone major changes. Activity 
in the credit market has been markedly cyclical, with strong momentum in the economic 
upswing, followed by a sharp decline during the crisis and a resurgence in the present 
recovery phase. In turn, the structure of the credit market has been shaped by several 
factors, such as, for instance, the different impact the crisis had on the different 
intermediaries or the restructuring of the financial system which resulted in a significant 
reduction in the number of institutions.
This article analyses how credit market activity and structure evolved in Spain between 
2004 and 2015, based on the figures for the volume of new loans formalised by resident 
institutions obtained from interest rate statistics.1 This information should better reflect the 
flow of new lending than outstanding amounts, since it is not affected by repayments of 
loans granted in the past. Another advantage of using this data source is that, in the case 
of lending to non‑financial corporations, it draws a distinction between loans for more/ 
less than €1  million, which may be taken as a proxy for different credit market trends 
according to firm size.
The analysis is broken down by institutional sectors – households and non‑financial 
corporations – receiving lending. Additionally, in the first case a breakdown is made by 
loan purpose (home loans, consumer loans, other) and, in the second case, by loan size 
(more or less than €1 million). The data are explored at aggregate level, and also to detect 
possible differences in behaviour for different groups of institutions.
The article is split into five sections, including the introduction. The second section 
describes how aggregate credit market activity evolved in Spain between 2004 and 2015, 
and the third focuses on the breakdown by category of institutions. The fourth section 
analyses the progress made in the consolidation and resizing of the sector in that period, 
and the fifth summarises the main conclusions drawn.
The left‑hand panel of Chart 1 tracks lending volume between December 2004 and June 
2015, broken down between the main lending segments. The data are presented as an 
index number, with base 100 at the start of the sample, making it easier to observe the 
relative changes in volume.2 As can be seen, over the last ten years credit market activity 
has been markedly cyclical across all the segments analysed. In particular, three clearly 
defined phases can be identified. In the first, essentially coinciding with the period of 
economic expansion that preceded the last crisis (2004‑2007), the volume is on the 
increase. In the second, covering the economic contraction, it falls sharply, and in the 
third, from 2013 H2 to the end of the period analysed, it rebounds, coinciding with the 
Introduction
Aggregate activity
1  The returns containing the information that is sent to the ECB for compilation of the euro area bank interest rate 
statistics. The balance of loans used corresponds to the headings recording new loans granted in the month, not 
including outstanding amounts of revolving loans, which are recorded under other headings, or automatic loan 
extensions.
2  It should be noted that in June 2010 a change was made in the definition of lending of certain aggregates that 
particularly affected consumer lending, creating a statistical break around that date.
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economic recovery. Nevertheless, despite this resurgence, the most recent levels are still 
very short of the high points reached during the expansionary phase.
The intensity of these fluctuations in activity levels varies somewhat by credit market 
segment. The sharpest decline during the crisis was in the volume of lending to 
households and, especially, of home loans; this is linked to the extraordinary growth 
recorded in the pre‑crisis period, the imbalances built up in the real estate market and 
its role in the crisis.
Loans under €1 million to non‑financial corporations, which include loans to SMEs, display 
a less marked cyclical pattern than loans to households. Thus, in the expansionary phase 
that preceded the crisis, the flow of lending rose at a slower pace, and during the crisis the 
decline was less pronounced. The panel also shows that activity in this segment is more 
stable over time than lending in the other segments, probably as a result of its more 
recurring nature. In particular, and unlike households, firms are continuously rolling over 
their financing, as they have permanent debt positions at shorter terms. Moreover, smaller 
firms have more limited access to non‑bank financing, which makes their lending flows 
more stable compared with those of large corporations.
In the case of loans over €1 million to non‑financial corporations (more representative of 
loans to large corporations), the synchrony between activity and the business cycle is less 
evident. Thus, at the start of the sample, the volume of lending in this segment was heading 
down, in a period of economic expansion, and the recovery in the most recent phase 
began later than in the other segments. These differences are probably explained by the 
fact that large one‑off transactions have more influence in this lending segment, and that 
large corporations have recourse to non‑bank financing. Also, the decline during the crisis 
was more moderate than in the other segments, which is undoubtedly linked to the fact 
that large corporations were less severely hit by the crisis than SMEs.
Turning to activity levels, the right‑hand panel of Chart  1, which presents the data in 
monetary units, shows that, throughout the period analysed, the highest amounts are in 
the two segments depicting lending to corporations. This is a result of the significance of 
this financing channel in terms of outstanding amounts, and of the high rotation linked to 
the large volume of short‑term transactions, especially in the case of lending to large 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a 12-month moving average.
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corporations. In lending to households, the highest level of activity is in home loans. 
However, as a result of the sharp fall during the crisis, the figures are now much closer to 
those of the other two household lending segments, where average loan duration is 
generally much shorter and, therefore, lending is relatively higher in terms of gross flows 
than in terms of outstanding amounts.
In order to determine to what extent activity levels in the different credit market segments 
vary by type of institution, this section analyses the separate patterns observed in each 
market segment for the following four categories: large institutions with significant business 
abroad and their Spanish subsidiaries; institutions that were classified as Groups 1 and 2 
(hereafter, G1‑G2) in the context of the process of restructuring and recapitalisation of the 
Spanish banking sector;3 all other Spanish institutions; and lastly, subsidiaries and 
branches of foreign institutions operating in Spain.
Chart 2 tracks how the volume of lending of each category has evolved in the different 
credit market segments4 (in terms of index numbers with base 100 in 2004 Q4, to facilitate 
comparison in relative terms). In general, the pattern is similar across all four categories, 
with the same three phases that are observed in the aggregate data. There are, however, 
certain significant differences in the intensity of the patterns in each phase.
Among the G1‑G2 institutions, the volume of new lending in the expansionary phase that 
preceded the crisis showed much greater momentum than in the other categories, across 
almost all segments. The marked growth in lending in the boom period could indeed be 
one of the factors that made these institutions more vulnerable to adverse developments. 
During the crisis, the decline was comparatively more pronounced among these institutions; 
this is undoubtedly linked to the greater deterioration of their financial positions when the 
crisis first struck, which squeezed their ability to meet the demand for credit, and to the 
requirements arising from the subsequent restructuring plans.
Lending by subsidiaries and branches of foreign institutions was less dynamic than market 
lending overall in the expansionary phase before the crisis, which may have made them 
less vulnerable to the subsequent adverse macroeconomic developments, in contrast to 
the case of the G1‑G2 institutions. The lower relative impact of the crisis on subsidiaries 
and branches of foreign institutions, and the possible support from their parent institutions, 
may help explain why, during the crisis, the decline in their volume of lending was less 
pronounced than in the sector overall.
There are no significant differences between the other two categories of institutions in 
lending to households, with a pattern very similar to the sector aggregate. However, in the 
case of lending to corporations, the momentum is quite different. In loans under €1 million, 
large institutions’ activity levels are on the decrease throughout the period analysed, 
Activity by category 
of institution
3  The G1‑G2 institutions were those hardest hit by the crisis. Group 1 comprised the banks in which the FROB had 
a majority holding when the stress tests were conducted in 2012 (BFA/Bankia, Catalunya Caixa, NCG Banco and 
Banco de Valencia). Group 2 comprised the banks that had a capital shortfall, in light of the 2012 stress tests, 
and that were unable to address that shortfall without having recourse to State aid. In the case of banks that were 
a result of mergers with, or acquisitions of, other institutions that subsequently disappeared, the figures presented 
in this section are the sum of the volumes of the individual institutions that were merged. Another point to note 
is that in the most recent period, as a consequence of the culmination of the restructuring process, some of the 
G1‑G2 institutions have been acquired by other institutions and have disappeared, resulting in lower aggregate 
activity for this category. However, this effect is only quantitatively significant in the last two quarters of the 
sample.
4  In order to simplify the presentation in the charts, household consumer loans and household other loans have 
been grouped together.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 42 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, SEPTEMBER 2015 SPANISH CREDIT MARKET ACTIVITY AND STRUCTURE, 2004-2015
whereas in the category comprising all other Spanish institutions the pattern is more 
cyclical, in keeping with the overall market figures. In the case of loans over €1 million the 
picture is similar for both categories, although the decline during the crisis was more 
moderate among the large institutions.
Naturally, the different lending patterns have affected the market shares of the different 
categories of institutions, measured by the sum of lending (see Chart 3). The category 
made up of foreign institutions has tended to gain share since the onset of the crisis, going 
from around 5% to close on 10% in the most recent period, and even somewhat higher in 
the segment of lending to households other than home loans. The G1‑G2 institutions 
gained share from the start of the sample up to 2009 in most segments, especially in home 
loans, up to levels around 40%. Subsequently the opposite was the case, in light of the 
adjustment and restructuring process at the G1‑G2 institutions. The most recent 
developments in their market share are shaped by a number of acquisitions of institutions 
that have led to their disappearance, their business being absorbed into the other 
categories.
In the case of the other two categories of Spanish institutions, the most striking feature as 
regards market share is the gradual decline in the large institutions’ share in favour of the 
other national intermediaries in loans under €1 million, while in loans over €1 million the 
opposite occurs. This shows that over the period analysed the specialisation of institutions 
by type of customer has changed, as large institutions with significant business abroad 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a 12-month moving average.
b Large Spanish institutions with a high percentage of business abroad. Includes their Spanish subsidiaries.
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have tended to focus on lending to large corporations, while the other Spanish institutions 
have focused on lending to smaller firms.
The top left‑hand panel of Chart 4 shows how, after the onset of the crisis, the number of 
“operational” institutions in the credit market (understood as those which, in accordance 
with the regulations, report data on their new lending for the purposes of compilation of 
European bank interest rate statistics)5 has decreased across all segments, as a 
consequence of consolidation in the sector in the context of the restructuring undertaken 
as a result of the impact of the crisis. The sharpest drop was in the period 2011‑2013; 
since then the number of institutions has been steady at 40  to 50, according to the 
segment, compared with 90 to 100 in the period 2004‑2007.
The drop in the number of operational institutions naturally led to a gradual increase in the 
degree of concentration of activity on the credit market, as shown by the indicators in 
Chart 4. Thus, since the start of the crisis the market share of the three and five most active 
institutions (see two bottom panels) has grown, with a slightly larger increase in lending to 
corporations (16 pp ‑ 21 pp) than in lending to households (1 pp ‑ 12 pp). Moreover, in the 
case of lending to non‑financial corporations, these indicators are higher. Thus, in the 
Number of operational 
institutions
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a 12-month moving average.
b Large Spanish institutions with a high percentage of business abroad. Includes their Spanish subsidiaries.
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5  It should be noted that since June 2010, the only institutions that report their lending activity are those which, at 
31 December 2009, had total assets on the summary balance sheet (EMU 1) equal to or more than €1.5 billion 
and, on the EMU 2 return, deposits or loans in euro vis‑à‑vis euro area households and non‑financial corporations 
equal to or more than €500  million (Banco de España Circular  1/2010). Previously only the second criterion 
applied (Banco de España Circular 4/2002).
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most recent period, the market share of the three and five most active institutions is 68% 
and 78%, respectively, in loans over €1  million to corporations, and 53% and 67%, 
respectively, in loans under €1 million to corporations. In the case of lending to households, 
the figures are approximately 40% and 55%, respectively.
Using the Herfindahl index (another indicator generally used to measure the degree of 
concentration that takes into account not only the market shares of the most active 
institutions but also those of the full sample),6 similar conclusions are obtained (see top 
right‑hand panel).
In any event, the data presented in Chart  4 suggest that the number of operational 
institutions is not the only factor on which the degree of concentration depends. Thus, for 
example, as Chart 4 shows, in loans over €1 million to firms, the various concentration 
indicators declined in the period 2004‑2006, with no appreciable change in those years in 
the number of active institutions. Likewise, in the most recent period these indicators 
declined in several segments, with no associated increase in the number of intermediaries.
The rise, since the onset of the crisis, in the degree of concentration measured by the 
volume of lending can also be seen by analysing the series calculated on the basis of 
institutions’ credit balances or the size of their balance sheets.7 The growth in the 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Calculated on basis of 12-month moving average.
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6  Specifically, the Herfindahl index is defined as the sum of the squares of the market shares of all the institutions. 
The higher the index, the higher the degree of concentration.
7  See, for example, ECB (2014) and Rubio and Zurita (2014).
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concentration indicators thus calculated has been more pronounced than that observed in 
other European countries, which is consistent with the greater intensity of the sector 
consolidation process in Spain, although it has to be borne in mind that the Spanish 
financial system set out from a comparatively lower base.8
It should be noted that this higher market concentration responds to the need identified 
post‑crisis to correct the excessive size of the sector. To assess the impact on competition 
in the industry, analysis of indicators such as the spread between average interest rates on 
new lending in each segment and the synthetic rate on deposits received may also be 
useful. In this respect, the changes in this spread in recent years do not appear to signal 
that higher concentration in the Spanish credit market has been accompanied by lower 
competition. Thus, as Chart 5 shows, in most credit market segments these spreads are 
now close to the average values for the period analysed.9 
This article illustrates the major changes observed in the Spanish credit market over the 
last ten years. Activity in the credit market has been markedly cyclical, with volumes of 
lending that were very high and on the increase during the expansionary phase, followed 
by a sharp fall during the crisis and a gradual recovery since end‑2013. This most recent 
performance, achieved on the back of the improved economic and financial conditions, 
should continue in coming months, although there is still the high level of private sector 
debt to contend with. It would not, in any event, be either foreseeable or desirable for the 
figures to return to the levels reached in the expansionary phase, which led to the build‑up 
of various imbalances and made the Spanish economy more vulnerable to adverse 
developments.
Over the period analysed the structure of the Spanish credit market also underwent major 
changes. The most significant development was undoubtedly the reduction in the number 
of operational institutions, essentially as a consequence of the restructuring process 
undertaken to solve the problem of the excessive size of the Spanish financial sector 
Conclusions
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Average weighted interest rate in corresponding category minus synthetic deposit rate.
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8  There is no data available to compare the degree of concentration in Spain with that of other countries calculated 
on the basis of the volume of lending.
9  It should be noted that fluctuations in these indicators may respond to other factors apart from the level of 
competition, such as changes in perceived credit risk.
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identified as a result of the crisis. The data presented here suggest, in addition, that these 
changes have not been accompanied by a decline in the level of competition, since the 
loan‑deposit gap in most segments is now at average historical levels.
14.9.2015.
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